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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions
of Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103.

ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court erred in denying Hughes' motion to suppress evidence
obtained as a result of an illegal seizure. This issue presents a question of law
reviewed for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 11 15, 103 P.3d 699. And,
"[w]hen a case involves the reasonableness of a search and seizure" the Court "
affords little discretion to the district court because there must be state-wide standards
that guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials." State v. Barker, 229 P.3d 650
(Utah 2010), quoting State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, 11 12, 78 P.3d 590 (internal
quotation marks omitted). This issue was preserved in a motion to suppress (R. 32;
75).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
AT ISSUE
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
1

or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. Amend. IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case
Austin Hughes appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. (R.

68). Following denial of his motion to suppress, Hughes entered conditional guilty
pleas, reserving his right to appeal, to Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class
B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-502; Unlawful
Possession of Alcohol by a Minor, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated § 32a-12-209; and, Immediate Notice of Accident Required, a Class B
Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 12.16.010(A) of the Salt Lake City Code. This
appeal follows.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Austin Hughes was charged by Information filed in Third District Court on

March 6, 2009 with: False Information With Intent to be Another Actual Person;
Possession of Another's Identifying Documents; Driving Under the Influence;
Unlawful Possession of Alcohol by a Minor; Driving on Alcohol Restrictions;
Immediate Notice of Accident Required; and, Negligent Collision.
2

On August 21, 2009, Hughes filed his motion to suppress and the trial court
held a hearing on the motion November 11, 2009. (R. 32; 40-41). The City requested
a briefing schedule and oral argument was held on January 4, 2010. (R. 56-57). The
trial court denied Hughes' motion on that date and entered findings on April 26,2010.
(R. 69-70). Hughes filed his notice of appeal on April 29, 2010. (R. 71-72).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On February 15, 2009, Officer Ruff of the Salt Lake City Police Department
witnessed Hughes "running" down the street. (75: 4). At the motion hearing, Officer
Ruff testified that he witnessed Hughes "running" at 2:30 AM when the temperature
was in the low 20's. (R. 75: 6). He further testified that Hughes was not wearing
workout clothing or a coat, but instead was wearing a t-shirt and jeans. (R. 75: 6).
Ruff testified that Hughes "ran" across the street and entered a bank parking lot. (R.
75: 6). Ruff stated that Hughes"ran" in a diagonal across the street. (R. 75: 5).
When questioned by the prosecutor regarding what Officer Ruff could have charged
Hughes with at that point, Ruff testified that he could have charged Hughes with Jaywalking and trespassing onto bank property. (R. 75: 8). Ruff followed Hughes into
the bank parking lot and turned on his red and blue lights, tapped his siren and then
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announced over his PA system that he was a police officer and asked Hughes to stop.
(R. 75: 7; 17).
Cross-examination revealed that Officer Ruff failed to articulate anything in his
written police report that Hughes failed to use a crosswalk when running across the
street. (R. 75: 14-15). Also, Ruff testified that he made at least 100 detentions since
the arrest of Hughes and recalls all of the facts of his encounter with Hughes although
he failed to mention anywhere in his report the allegation of Jay-walking. (R. 75:15).
Further examination also revealed that Officer Ruff could not remember whether
Hughes was wearing "running" shoes and failed to include that information in his
written report. (R. 75: 19). However, Ruff did include other information in his
written report that included the name brand of Hughes' shirt he was wearing. (R. 75:
17). Ruff testified that his decision to seize Hughes occurred when Ruff saw Hughes
run behind the bank and not when Hughes allegedly failed to use a crosswalk. (R.
75:18). Ruff stated that he could not recall signs posted that patrons could not enter
the bank parking lot at night or that entering the parking lot would constitute
trespassing. (R. 75:19). Following his testimony, Officer Ruff removed himself from
the courtroom, walking right out of the courtroom without having been formally
excused by the Court. (R. 75: 21).
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In denying his motion, the trial court found the officer "had reasonable
articulable suspicion to make a stop, that stop simply being based upon the totality of
the circumstances at the time, those being the 2 a.m. in the morning, 25 degrees,
running down the street, and with jeans and a t-shirt, that that's a sufficient basis for
the Court- for the officer to have reasonable articulable suspicion that an infraction
that occurred at being [sic] jay-walking was sufficient for the stop." (R. 76: 9).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The level two stop and detention of Hughes, which ultimately led to Officer
Ruff discovering additional reason to detain Hughes, was not justified by reasonable,
articulable suspicion and therefore violates the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In addition, all evidence discovered after that
unlawful detention must be excluded as fruits of the poisonous tree.

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING HUGHES5 MOTION TO
SUPPRESS WHERE THE LEVEL TWO STOP AND DETENTION, WHICH LED
TO FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF HUGHES, WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY
REASONABLE SUSPICION.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects people from
"unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. There are three levels
5

of encounters between police officers and citizens which are considered to be
constitutionally permissible. Salt Lake City v. Ray, 998 P.2d 274 (Utah Ct. App.
2000). Each level requires a different degree of justification under the Fourth
Amendment. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
The three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters between law
enforcement officers and the public are: "(1)

an

officer may approach a citizen at

anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the
person has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the 'detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop';
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an
offense has been committed or is being committed." State v. Deitman, 739 P2d 616,
617-618 (Utah 1987) (per curiam)(citations omitted). The limited issue in this case
is whether Officer Ruffs action of turning on his red and blue lights, tapping his siren
and announcing over his PA system his status as a police officer and ordering Hughes
to stop was justified at its inception. This case is correctly categorized as a level two
stop. (R. 75: 21). In order for a law enforcement officer to justify a level two stop,
the officer must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that crime is afoot. See, State
v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1140, (Utah 1994).
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"'Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure5
within the meaning of [the Fourth] Amendment [ ], even though the purpose of the
stop is limited and the resulting detention brief."' State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,11 28,
63 P.3d 463 (quoting De/aware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d
660 (1979)). To determine whether such a traffic stop is reasonable requires a two
step process: One, a[w]as the police officer's action justified at its inception?" Two,
"[w]as the resulting detention reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that
justified the interference in the first place?" Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at 1f 29; Lopez,
873 P.2d at 1131-32. Hughes did not challenge before the trial court the scope of the
detention. Consequently, the analysis here will address only whether Ruffs actions
were justified at the inception.
Hughes was seized in violation of his constitutional protections. Officer Ruff
testified that he witnessed Hughes "running" at 2:30 AM, when the temperature was
in the 20's and Hughes was not wearing workout clothing or a coat; that Hughes was
wearing a t-shirt and jeans and that allegedly he did not use a crosswalk when
"running" across the street and entering a bank parking lot. (R. 75: 5-7). Based on
those observations, Officer Ruff turned on his red and blue lights and stopped Hughes.
(R. 75: 18). Ruff made the decision to seize Hughes based on Ruffs incorrect legal
conclusion that Hughes was trespassing onto private property. (R. 75: 18).

7

Banks have given their permission to enter onto their property after banking
hours to use ATM machines. Hughes suggests that it is not uncommon for the public
to take advantage of ATM machines at all hours of the day and night for unlimited
reasons. The person entering bank owned property may need to acquire cash to hail
a cab, buy groceries after their swing shift, buy some beer at a local 7-11, or even to
pay a babysitter when they get home after an office party. The scenarios as to why
someone would go onto bank owned property and use an ATM machine are endless.
As the Supreme Court has clearly stated, this Court's proper role is to zealously "guard
against police conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which trenches upon
personal security without the objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution
requires." Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.
Under the totality of the circumstances, this Court should also consider what
was not included in Officer Ruffs written report. Officer Ruff conceded on crossexamination that he did not mention anywhere in his report that he witnessed Hughes
fail to use a crosswalk. (R. 75: 14). Under the totality analysis, the Court should
view as suspect Officer Ruffs clear recollection of the events that occurred almost 10
months prior to his testimony. During the ensuing 10 month period Officer Ruff was
involved with more than 100 intervening detentions of various subjects. (R. 75:15).
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Reasonable minds would likely question the officer's remarkable memory of this one
instance in the distant past.
An obvious example that supports this conclusion was elicited on crossexamination. Officer Ruff was questioned about whether the Defendant was wearing
running shoes and the officer conceded that he did not remember. (R. 75: 19).
However, the officer contends that he clearly remembers critical facts that could
possibly justify a legal seizure of Hughes. (R. 75: 15-19).
Also, Officer Ruffs inclusion of information regarding what type of t-shirt the
Defendant was wearing should be considered by the Court in this analysis. Officer
Ruff was compelled to put in his written report the fact that Hughes was wearing a
shirt with the name-brand "Hollister" written on the front. During cross-examination,
Officer Ruff conceded that this name-brand is not associated with criminal activity in
his mind. (R. 75: 17). During the time the facts were most clear to Officer Ruff he
felt compelled to provide a description of the t-shirt worn by Hughes; presumably so
he would not forget. The failure of Officer Ruff to include critical information in the
written report yet claiming the ability to recall the necessary information, very clearly,
10 months later in a court proceeding should be evaluated by this Court under the
totality analysis. Hughes argues that Officer Ruffs failure to memorialize in his
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written report a legal basis that may have supported a seizure and then later testifying
that he vividly recalls information not in the official written police report is suspect.
Hughes is not suggesting that the trial court is not in the best position to have
judged the credibility of Officer Ruff. While it is true that this Court will grant no
deference to the trial court's application of the law to the facts in search and seizure
cases, this Court will review the district court's factual findings "under a clearly
erroneous standard." Brake, 2004 UT 95 at 1115. "The judge is the fact finder at such
a hearing, and as such, is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses." State v.
Ballenberger, 652 P.2d 927, 929 n. 6 (Utah 1982). However, this Court must still
engage in a totality of the circumstances analysis which requires a full analysis
including the fact that Ruff failed to mention in his written report any suggestion that
Hughes failed to use a crosswalk as well as Ruffs incorrect legal conclusion that
Hughes was trespassing onto private property.
It is not simply a question of whether the trial court found Ruff a credible
witness. In fact, it seems the trial court did have reservations when Ruff excused
himself from the courtroom without permission enough that the trial court noted it on
the record. (R. 75: 21).
Not without import in this analysis is the fact that not included among the seven
counts filed in the Information is the charge of Failing to Use a Crosswalk in violation
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of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-1003. Nor was a charge of trespassing pursued by
the City. The City obviously would have had difficulty charging the offenses in the
Information as these actions did not appear anywhere in Officer Ruffs written report.
Again, there must be state-wide standards for police to follow as established by this
Court. See, State v. Barker, 229 P.3d 650, quoting State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,1f 12,
78 P.3d 590. If this Court does not reverse the district court in this instance, a new
state-wide standard will be created allowing police to seize any individual who enters
bank owned property after hours whether or not they are there to use an ATM.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Hughes requests that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress and remand this case to the Third District Court for further proceedings.
DATED t h i s ^ £ day of July, 2010.

Jon D. Williams
Attorney for Appellant
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

SIMARJIT S. GILL. #6389
SALT LAKE CITY PROSECUTOR
Dawn W.Emery. #10443
Assistant City Prosecutor
Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office
349 South 200 East. Fifth Floor
Sail Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 535-7767
Facsimile: (801)535-7253

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE CITY.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff.
vs. •
Case No. 095900065
AUSTIN JAMES HUGHES.
JUDGE Randall Skanchy
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on January 4. 2010, for a hearing on Defendant's
Motion to Suppress. The Plaintiff. Salt Lake City Corporation, was represented by Dawn W.
Emery. Mr. Jon D. Williams argued the motion to suppress on behalf of defendant. Identity and
jurisdiction were stipulated to for the purpose of the motion hearing.
The issue before the Court was whether Officer Ruff had reasonable suspicion to stop the
Defendant.
FINDINGS
The Court, having heard evidence, made the following findings:
1. Stop was at 2:00 a.m.
2. It was 25 degrees out.
3. Defendant was running down the street with jeans and a t-shirt.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to make the stop under a totality of
the circumstances.
2. There was a sufficient basis for the officer to have reasonable articulable
suspicion that the infraction of jaywalking had occurred.

The Court's order is as follows Defendant's motion to suppress is DENIED.
Dated this PQ>

day of April 2010.

Dawn W. Emery
Assistant City Prosecutor
Jon Williams
Attorney for defendant
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
The undersigned hereby certifies that she caused the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress to be sent via [ ] courier. [ ] delivered,
[3E] email [ ] sent via U.S. mail and [ ] faxed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the
Defendant's attorney:
Jon Williams
Attorney for Defendant
341 South Main Street Suite 406
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Dated this

day of April. 2010.

Dawn W. Emery
Assistant Citv Prosecutor

Transcript of Oral Ruling of the Court

morning, 25 degrees outside, someone running or sprinting, as the
officer tried to opine at the hearing, without wearing a jacket,
3

or now reflective gear.

That's, J think, the first that that's

4 I come up is from the City's -- in the City's pleading.

Is that a

basis to seize someone with (inaudible) and I suggest that it/s
6
7

not.

I would ask the Court to grant our motion.
THE COURT:

Well, thank you for the briefing as well as

8

the arguments.

It is the defendant's motion, so I think they got

9

the last word.

They ultimately had their argument and you've had

10

that argument.

11

I'm going to deny the motion to suppress based upon

12

this Court's finding that the officer had reasonable articulable

13

suspicion to make a stop, that stop simply being based upon the

14

totality of the circumstances at the time, those being the 2 a.m.

15

in the morning, 25 degrees, running down the street, and with

16

jeans and a t-shirt, that that's a sufficient basis for the

17

Court -- for the officer to have reasonable articulable suspicion

18

that an infraction that occurred at being jay-walking was

19

sufficient for the stop.

20

Okay.

21

MS. EMERY:

'22
23
24

If the City will prepare the order.
Thank you, your Honor.

MR. WILLIAMS:

Your Honor, for purposes of scheduling,

could we just set this out for a pre-trial date?
THE COURT:

Sure.

MR. WILLIAMS:

Thank you.

